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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 16777 
SALVADOR P. TOSCANO, SR., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
At the outset, it must be clear that while this 
case concerns information given by Appellant, it does not 
concern an affirmative misrepresentation, as Respondent 
implies. Instead the crucial issues center on the meaning 
of the word "occupy" and comprise widespread public policy 
ramifications concerning the State's treatment of migrant 
workers and the application of equitable estoppel when the 
State's conduct is less than scrupulous. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE FINANCIAL 
ASSISTANCE BECAUSE HE OWNED EXEMPT PROPERTY 
IN MULESHOE, TEXAS. 
The regulation that is the basis for this controversy 
is found at Utah's Vol. II Assistance Payments Manual §410.1, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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pertaining ~o exempt assets. That regulation allows the 
exemption of one "home and lot owned or being purchased and 
occupied by the applicant ..•. " However, if the applicant's 
home does not fit that requirement, it will be considered a 
resource in evaluating his need for financial assistance. 
Appellant has offered many ways to assist the 
Court in interpreting whether Appellant has indeed satisfied 
the requirement. In the endeavor to shed some light on the 
meaning of this previously undefined, but crucial word 
"occupy," Appellant offered the guidance used in a similar 
program of public assistance, that of food stamp assistance. 
Contrary to Respondent's allegation that Appellant has 
attempted to confuse the Court by offering the regulations 
governing food stamp eligibility, Brief of Respondent at 4, 
Appellant merely suggests that some guidance might be had by 
ref erring to regulations that have been tested by similar 
situations as those presented by the instant case. 
It is important to note that food stamp assistance 
is not governed exclusively by regulations of the United 
States Department of Agriculture and that cash assistance is 
not governed exclusively by regulations of the United States 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (now Health and 
Human Services). See Brief of Respondent at 5. Both programs 
are governed by more specific State regulations. The State 
is free to interpret the definition of an exempt home for 
financial assistance in the same way as for food stamp 
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assistance. 45 C.F.R. §233.20(a) (3) (1975]. Presented with 
the situation of migrant workers whose homes are located in 
other states, the State promulgated Vol. IV Assistance 
Payments Manual §§304.21 and 680.3 (presently 680.5). The 
effect of these provisions is to allow a migrant worker to 
own a home in another state and consider it an exempt resource. 
The sense of this is obvious: a person should not be denied 
the assistance he so gravely needs because he maintains a 
home for his family, but because of his work skills and 
economic status is forced to travel interstate to find 
employment. When his situation. allows, he returns to the 
house that only he and his family occupy. In interpreting 
the regulations otherwise, the State has no qualms about 
giving a person who resides in a house financial assistance, 
but because a person is forced by his occupation to live in 
various tents and shacks, the State will deny him assistance. 
Therefore, since the State in its food stamp 
program, whose goals are similar to the financial assistance 
program, has considered the equities and public policy 
considerations of a migrant's living situation, reference to 
the regulations that address this specific situation should 
suggest the approach to be taken in this case. 
To further assist the Court in determining the 
occupancy requirement, Appellant cited past cases that have 
passed upon the meaning of "occupy." Appellant's Brief at 
5-7. Respondent gives only a cursory answer to those cases, 
simply categorizing them as "insurance cases" and does not 
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even attempt to respond to Macomber v. State Social Welfare 
Board, 175 Cal.App.2d 614, 346 P.2d 808 (Ct.App. 1968), 
which faced a similar issue in the public assistance context. 
Instead, Respondent attempts to refute the case law interpretations 
of "occupy" by reciting Respondent's counsel's life history. 
Counsel's educational and travel background hardly seems 
appropriate in the present context. By his recitation of 
personal history, counsel for Respondent clearly shows his 
failure to comprehend the basic nature of this case. His 
travel for edu~ational purposes and the duration of his 
absence were by choice. Appellant, on the other hand, had 
to travel and be absent from his home in order to pursue a 
livelihood. Further, counsel's life story evidences an 
intent to remain in Utah. He reveals nothing to indicate 
that he still considered his parent's house the home he then 
occupied. 
Respondent also emphasizes that Appellant was in 
Utah from the period of December, 1975, to June, 1976. 
Brief of Respondent at 10. However, Respondent fails to 
note that Appellant's injury severely limited his mobility, 
hindering his ability to travel back home to Texas. Appellant 
felt further compelled to remain in Utah to make sure that 
liability for medical expenses was resolved. Tr. at 95, 
Supplemental Record. To twist Appellant's physical pain and 
extreme honesty to look like he stayed in Utah only to 
collect his financial assistance is particularly insidious. 
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Taken overall, case law and other similar public 
assistance programs, like food stamps, have interpreted 
"occupy" in a way that only supports Appellant. Most importantly, 
the equities favor Appellant: to allow the State recovery 
is to punish a man because he must travel to make a living. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT WAS WITHOUT FAULT IN SUPPLYING THE 
INFORMATION ON HIS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
APPLICATION AND SHOULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE 
THEREFOR. 
In order to accurately complete any sort of applica-
tion, one must be able to understand what questions are 
being asked. It is clear from the record that Appellant did 
not understand the questions on his application for financial 
assistance. This resulted from the absence of a person 
reasonably fluent in Spanish to assist Appellant at the time 
he was filling out the application. The caseworker who 
assisted Appellant was Lloyd Laws, an employee of the Assistance 
Payments office. As the record demonstrates, Mr. Laws does 
not speak Spanish. R. at 113-14, Tr. at 22-23. Nor could 
_Respondent prove that any Spanish-speaking individual was 
present while Appellant applied for aid. R. at 126, Tr. at 
35. 
Respondent seeks to rebut this by suggesting the 
possibility that the Assistance Payments off ice employed at 
least one person who spoke Spanish at the time Appellant 
applied for assistance. Then Respondent makes the illogical 
leap that if Appellant applied at the Assistance Payments 
office, he would have had assistance from an interpreter. 
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This argument exhibits several fallacies. First, the testimony 
reveals only that someone spoke Spanish. There is nothing 
in the record to indicate that anyone was fluent. To say in 
such general terms that someone "speaks" Spanish may mean 
someone is fluent, or it may mean someone knows enough 
Spanish words to order from a menu in Spanish. Second, and 
most important, even assuming a person fluent in Spanish was 
employed by the Assistance Payments office, there is absolutely 
no indication that this person assisted Appellant. The 
office could have many employees fluent in Spanish, but they 
are of no avail if they are not present during an applicant's 
application procedure. 
Further, Respondent wonders whether Appellant 
applied at the Migrant Council's office or the Assistance 
Payments office. Brief, supra at 12. The Migrant Council 
off ice had not yet even been opened at the time of application 
in 1975. R. at 150, Tr. at 59. Respondent's assertions as 
to assistance by an interpreter do not have much credence, 
when they are not even sure where the application was filled 
out. 
To further attempt to show that Appellant had the 
assistance of someone fluent in Spanish, Respondent cites 
the fact that Millie Rodriguez Valencia notarized the financial 
assistance application. Brief, supra at 13. Obviously, 
there is a difference between notarizing and interpreting. 
In fact, the record reveals that Mrs. Valencia testified she 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
did not assist Appellant in filling out the application. R. 
at 145, Tr. at 54. The extent of her contact was merely to 
notarize the application. 
Respondent has used this fallacious assumption 
that an interpreter was available to assist Appellant to try 
to prove Appellant was at fault. Brief, supra. As stated 
before, the record does not reveal that an interpreter was 
made available to Appellant. Again even if an interpreter 
was available, nothing suggests that an interpreter assisted 
Appellant. Yet even if Respondent's allegation was true, it 
still does not prove Appellant was the one at fault. 
Even if Appellant admitted all that Respondent 
alleges in his Point II, there still remains the question of 
how Appellant interpreted the meaning of "occupy" as used in 
Vol. II §410.1. If, for instance, Appellant was asked by an 
interpreter whether he owned a home that he did not occupy, 
Appellant would have understood "occupy" to mean having a 
residence that he occupies by returning to it at the end of 
the picking season. 
In summary, Respondent has failed to prove that 
Appellant had anyone fluent in Spanish help him accurately 
complete the application for financial assistance. Further, 
Respondent has not proved that Appellant was at fault in any 
way in filling out the application. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT HAS NOT RAISED ANY ARGUMENT THAT 
WAS NOT PUT IN ISSUE IN THE LOWER COURT. 
-7-
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In Appellant's Brief at 14-15 the elements for 
equitable estoppel were listed. Those four criteria were: 
(1) whether the State's Assistance Payments office could 
have been aware of the relevant facts through reasonable 
diligence, as Appellant supplied all information that the 
State requested; (2) whether the Assistance Payments office 
should reasonably have expected Appellant to rely on its 
determination of his eligibility; (3) whether Appellant 
acted in good faith, unaware of a possible administrative 
error; and (4) whether Appellant, due to his reliance on the 
State's determination of his eligibility, will be injured by 
a recoupment of the alleged overpayment. 
In applying estoppel against the State, this Court 
in Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control, 602 P.2d 
689, 694 (Utah 1979), listed five criteria for equitable 






An "act inconsistent with the claim after-
wards asserted." Obviously in this case, 
this is satisfied by the recoupment of funds 
after the State determined Appellant eligible 
for assistance. 
Reliance by the other party on such act. 
Again it is obvious that Appellant has relied 
on the State by accepting the assistance. 
Injury resulting from the contradiction or 
repudiation of such act. A recoupment of the 
funds will gravely injure Appellant, since 
the funds were paid for basic necessities, 
and requiring repayment will deprive Appellant 
of his ongoing necessary living expenses. 
"Manifest injustice." If equitable estoppel 
is not applied against the State, Appellant 
will be punished for his migrant status and 
the State's failure to provide a competent 
interpreter. 
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(5) Lastly, not impairing the "exercise of 
governmental powers." Although discussed 
more extensively later in this Brief, suffice 
it to say that allowing Appellant to retain 
$2,921.00 will not impair the exercise of 
governmental powers; it should even be an 
incentive to the State to prevent more erroneous 
payments by providing competent interpreters. 
A perusal of the transcript reveals that these elements 
comprising estoppel were put in issue in the lower court. 
Additionally, while careful perusal of the transcript 
reveals that the elements as to violations of Appellant's 
Due Process and Equal Protection rights are implicit in all that 
was presented below, important constitutional issues 
should be dealt with no matter when they are raised. This 
Court in In re State in Interest of Woodward, 14 Utah 2d 
336, 384 P.2d 110 (1963), found that in case of doubt as to 
resolving constitutional issues raised for the first time on 
appeal, the Court would resolve in favor of considering 
constitutional questions. Utah is not alone in this view. 
The Arizona Supreme Court, for example, in Ruth v. Industrial_ 
Commission, 107 Ariz. 572, 490 P.2d 828 (1971), held that 
notwithstanding the general rule that questions not raised 
in the lower court will not be considered on appeal, questions 
of constitutionality that would impact with statewide significance, 
such as on Workmen's Compensation, should be considered. 
See also Norcor of America v. Southern Arizona Intern. Livestock 
Ass'n, 122 Ariz. 542, 596 P.2d 377 (1979). Clearly denying 
Spanish-speaking persons the opportunity to present their 
case for financial assistance has an impact on the migrant 
-9-
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population, who every year enters the state to be employed 
by Utah's agricultural economy, of such statewide significance 
as to be considered, even if the Court finds the constitutional 
questions not to have been raised in the lower court. 
POINT IV 
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS APPLICA-
BLE TO THIS CASE. 
Respondent seeks to attack this point in three 
ways. (1) Estoppel will not lie unless Appellant is completely 
without fault; (2) estoppels against the public are seldom 
allowed; and (3) estoppel will not lie based on only an 
innocent mistake. 
In asserting that the estopping par~y must be 
completely without fault, Respondent has made two mistakes. 
First, Respondent asserts that it has been proven Appellant 
was not without fault. As has been demonstrated, Respondent 
has not proved any fault on Appellant's part. Indeed, 
Respondent has not even successfully proved that Appellant 
made a mistake in claiming the Muleshoe property to be 
exempt. Second, Respondent relies on cases that do not 
stand for the position asserted: to invoke estoppel the 
party asserting it must be "completely without fault." 
Brief, supra at 18. On the contrary, in Newton v. Hornblower, Ins 
224 Kan. 506, 582 P.2d 1136 (1978), corporate directors were 
denied the use of estoppel in a stockholder's derivative 
action because they failed to show good faith and fairness 
in regard to certain transactions. The court held: "Equitable 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
estoppel is founded upon principles of morality and fair 
dealing and is available only for the protection of claims 
made in good faith. 11 582 P.2d at 1144. Nowhere is it said 
that the estopping party must be completely without fault. 
Instead the emphasis is upon good faith and fairness. 
Appellant's honesty, sincerity, and good faith have never 
been questioned. Additionally, fairness lies on the side 
of the Appellant. See Appellant's Brief at 10-14. Respondent 
also cites Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 
(Utah 1976) , for the "completely without fault" proposition. 
Nowhere in that case may that proposition be found. Rather 
that case emphasizes an obligation on the part of one party 
where there is a possibility of inducing reliance on the 
part of the other. 
Next, Respondent states that according to Corpus 
Juris Secundum, estoppels against the public are not corrunon. 
Brief of Respondent at 13. We are not concerned here with 
the popularity of various forms of relief, but with the 
appropriateness of relief. The C.J.S. quotation that Respondent 
relies on states that estoppel will not be allowed if it 
defeats public policy or the interests of justice. It has 
been shown that such public policy factors as encouraging 
those recipients who have been overpaid to come forward with 
that error and preventing further administrative errors 
would be promoted by granting estoppel. Also, the interests 
of justice lie on the side of Appellant. To recover financial 
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assistance from Appellant is to punish him for having to 
live a transient lifestyle in order to be employed, rather 
than living in his house year-round. Additionally, the 
courts have increasingly endorsed equitable estoppel against 
the government, Celebrity Club v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 
supra; Hoeber v. District of Columbia Redev. Land, 483 
F.Supp. 1356 (D.D.C. 1980). 
Respondent's third point is that an innocent 
mistake does not justify estoppel. Whereas that may be very 
true, Respondent must take blame for more than an innocent 
mistake. In hiving no bilingual staff to assist migrants, 
Respondent has made more than an innocent mistake. Because 
it is inevitable in Utah that some Spanish-speaking people 
will at times find themselves in need of public assistance, 
it falls within the realm of culpable negligence to not 
adequately provide for competent interpreters. In fact, 
this is the sort of culpable negligence this Court had in 
mind in Morgan, supra, 549 P.2d at 697, upon which Respondent 
again relies. Brief of Respondent at 19. 
In Celebrity Club, supra at 694-95, this Court had 
occasion to further elaborate upon the criteria for estoppel 
from Morgan, supra. Applying those criteria to a claim for 
estoppel against the government, the Court found language 
from State v. Sponburgh, 66 Wash.2d 135, 401 P.2d 635, 640 
(1965), "particularly appropriate": 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is pro-
perly applicable in a case such as this, otherwise 
the whim of an administrative body could bankrupt 
an applicant who acted in good faith in reliance 
upon a solemn written commitment. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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The conduct of government should always be 
scrupulously just in dealing with its citizens; 
and where a public official, acting within his 
authority and with knowledge of the pertinent 
facts, has made a commitment and the party to whom 
it was made has acted to his detriment in 
reliance on that commitment, the official should 
not be permitted to revoke that commitment. 
In the present case, Appellant followed the application 
procedures to the best of his understanding as they were 
explained to him at Respondent's office. Appellant then 
relied upon Respondent's determination of his eligibility. 
Thus Respondent has failed entirely in rebuttal to 
Appellant's claim of equitable estoppel. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO EQUAL PROTECTION AND 
DUE PROCESS WERE INFRINGED UPON IN APPELLANT's 
INTERVIEW FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. 
Respondent attacks Appellant's claim to violation 
of his constitutional rights in only one way: by asserting 
that the interview was in fact conducted in Spanish. Throughout 
this case it has been conclusively shown that Appellant did 
not have a fluent Spanish interpreter to assist in the 
application procedure. Specifically, even if the Assistance 
Payments office had an interpreter, it has not been shown 
that the interpreter was competent. And even if there was a 
competent interpreter, it has not been proven that the 
interpreter assisted Appellant. For Respondent to say, "It 
is conceivable that Millie Valencia assisted the Appellant 
in completing his financial assistance form," Brief, supra 
at 21, is directly contrary to her testimony. R. at 145, 
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Tr. at 54. For Respondent to point to the writing of "torn 
cartilage, left knee" on Appellant's application as indicating 
the aid of an interpreter, Brief, supra at 22, is to deny 
the very likely possibility that this information was obtained 
from a doctor's report. 
Respondent has conceded all the other arguments 
Appellant raised in relation to his constitutional claims. 
Respondent has based his argument on the invalid presumption 
that Appellant had a competent Spanish interpreter to assist 
him. Since that has been shown to be without adequate 
proof, Respondent is left with no rebuttal to the constitutional 
violations. 
CONCLUSION 
However, this Court need not deal with the constitu-
tional, equitable, or policy issues, if the Court simply 
finds that under the proper interpretation of the regulation 
in question, a man who owns his home and has travelled away 
from it, intending to return to it and without occupying any 
other home, "occupies" that home, so as to ~e equally entitled 
to assistance as a homeowner who is not compelled to seek a 
living on an itinerant basis. 
On this basis, the Court should reverse Appellant's 
liability for incorrect assistance assessed by the lower 
court and remand to the Department of Social Services for a 
determination of Appellant's eligibility for assistance 
under the correct interpretation of the regulation, during 
the period in question, and after termination of benefits 
-14-
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upon discovery of the "error." If, on the other hand, the 
Court determines Appellant was not eligible under the correct 
interpretation of the regulation, but that it is inequitable 
for the State to hold him liable for erroneous payments when 
he was unassisted in understanding the eligibility requirements, 
then the Court should still reverse Appellant's liability, 
but he cannot claim further eligibility for benefits. 
DATED this ~~ day of November, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. f__vvM!) ib1t / / ~g;; 
By Lucy Billings 
352 South Denver Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 328-8891 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to Stephen G. Schwendiman, Esq., Assistant Attorney 
General, 150 West North Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103, 
this Ji.!_ day of November, 1980. 
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